Abstract
Introduction
In the adversarial system of justice prevalent in the English-speaking world and many other countries, both sides in criminal and civil trials commonly have the right to retain scienti c experts who may, with the trial judge's permission, submit reports and o er specialized testimony at trial concerning aspects of evidence that may be beyond the knowledge of the ordinary juror or judge. Although the papers on ethics in this volume focus on adversarial systems of justice with special reference to forensic linguistics in the United States, it is hoped that much of the content is generalizable to linguistic legal consulting in other countries.
As Tiersma and Solan note (2002) , linguists have been permitted to testify (at least in the United States) on linguistic issues that touch on a wide range of topics, e.g.,
• trademark similarities and di erences and the likelihood of their confusion;
• the meanings of disputed passages in contracts, statutes, and allegedly libelous publications;
• the clarity of printed directions and warning labels in product liability cases;
• third-party interpretation of surreptitiously recorded conversations; • similarities and di erences between documents and voices in cases of plagiarism, disputed authorship, and aural recordings.
I am concerned in this article with an important question that Roger Shuy raises in his introduction to the ethics essays in this volume, 'What is an expert?' , and the related question, 'What can be done to help insure that wouldbe linguistics experts are genuinely quali ed for the forensic consulting tasks they may agree to take on?' As Stygall's essay in this volume makes clear, a number of professional and academic organizations have wrestled with the practical and ethical questions surrounding the quali cation of experts, and they o er several approaches to possible solutions. Within linguistics, however, there is currently little that is actively being done. In this essay, I examine several paths that might promote the retention of experts with good forensic linguistic credentials, suggesting ways in which the current system works well or ill and ways in which it might be made better. While the discussion here is framed largely in practical terms, the underlying ethical issues are clear enough: incompetent testimony is unethical, at least to the extent that the testi er (and/or the attorneys who employ her) knows -or should know -that the testimony is incompetent. Furthermore, insofar as possible, professional organizations have an ethical obligation to society to do what they can to further the most rigorously competent consulting work, whether in forensic applications or any other.
The trial judge as 'gatekeeper'
In America and elsewhere, trial judges themselves are given a great deal of power in allowing or disallowing expert testimony (Ainsworth 2006 , Howald 2006 , Tiersma and Solan 2002 , Wallace 1986 ). e trial judge's ruling is generally nal and is based on several factors: 1) What sort of precedent is there for allowing this particular kind of testimony? (For example, there is a long history of admitting linguistic testimony in trademark issues, and a great deal of resistance to linguistic voice-identi cation.)
2) Is the methodology that the expert proposes to use valid, accepted within the scienti c community, and properly applied to the case at hand?
3) Can the lawyers who are seeking to have a linguistics expert admitted convince the judge that the expert's knowledge of linguistics is really needed? It is sometimes argued that everybody who speaks English knows pretty much how to interpret the language -so an expert on language is simply unnecessary. On the other hand, it is just as o en argued that expert linguistic testimony will be so complicated and recondite that it will merely confuse the jury about questions to which common sense dictates obvious answers. Moreover, mindful that courtroom time is expensive, judges sometimes seem to place a great deal of importance on the relative determinative value of linguistic evidence as compared to other types of admissible evidence.
4) Is the putative expert really well enough quali ed to give reliable scienti c opinion on the questions to be addressed?
At least in the United States, item (4) appears to be the least important in the practice of judges. In general, legal professionals usually know little about linguistics, so if the judge is satis ed about points (1), (2), and (3), it o en takes little more than a PhD in English literature -not even in linguistics, and sometimes not even a PhD -to establish the candidate as a scienti c 'expert' in the English language for many of the types of cases noted above. In addition, once someone has been admitted to testify, that in itself can be argued as precedent for admitting that person again.
, us judges sometimes do not allow quali ed linguists to testify, while in many other instances they permit 'experts' to testify who are thoroughly unquali ed to discuss the issues that confront them. Attorneys sometimes nd such people simply by calling up English departments at universities and asking for teachers who specialize in grammar. Some putative experts advertise themselves on the internet and with listing services but have little record of actual research, publication, membership in relevant professional organizations -or even linguistics teaching. Furthermore, many who are bona de linguists are o en quali ed only in subspecialties of linguistics that have little or no relation to the issues raised in the particular case in which they are permitted to give testimony.
In short, although judges are given the power to prevent useless, misleading, and unquali ed testimony -what is sometimes called 'junk' or 'cargo-cult' science -the results are o en the admission of 'experts' who are not at all persons who would please quali ed linguists as representatives of the profession.
The trial process as lter
One reason that the law sets the bar low is surely practical: judges do not have the time or the academic resources to judge the actual quali cations in all of the elds in which lawyers seek the approval of scienti c experts. In addition, the legal system also depends on the adversarial system itself to separate the wheat from the cha -in the course of the trial. As the United States Supreme Court noted (in an important decision in a civil case captioned Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 [1993] 
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. [Daubert at 596] It was in the Daubert ruling that the Court assigned a 'gatekeeper role' to the trial judge to eliminate the most egregious putative experts and methodologies (Daubert at 597). By the same token, however, the Daubert authors expected that trial judges would be spared the seemingly impossible task of having to make highly sophisticated judgments about the possibly 'shaky' professional admissibility of a wide range of types of prospective expertise in many di erent elds. Opposing quali ed experts are expected to demolish the unquali ed ones in their reports, in their own testimony, and in their advice to the attorneys who have retained them.
In actual practice, of course, it does not always work out that way. A quali ed expert who is working with a weak lawyer may come o looking less knowledgeable than a less-than-quali ed expert who is consulting with a brilliant lawyer on the other side. And of course the writing and speaking abilities of the experts will be a factor in their credibility. Moreover, frequently owing to the complexity of the material, the experts for the two sides will merely cancel each other out, however superior Expert A's credentials -and analysis -may be to those of Expert B.
In other cases, the presence of two experts can give a judge the opportunity to cherry-pick the testimony to nd 'evidence' that bolsters an argument that he has already decided on other grounds. For example, in a case (which created considerable negative comment among American linguists), a professor of English testi ed that the trademarks Lexus and Lexis are not likely to be confused because they are in pronunciation, arguing as follows:
Of course, anyone can pronounce 'lexis' and 'lexus' the same, either both with an unstressed I or both with an unstressed U, or schwa -or with some sound in between. But, properly, the distinction between unstressed I and unstressed U, or schwa, is a standard one in English; the distinction is there to be made in ordinary, reasonably careful speech. [Expert testimony quoted in Mead Data Central, Inc., v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., and Toyota Motor Corp., 875 F.2d 1026 at 1029 , 1030 (2d Cir., 1989 is testimony was mentioned favorably in the written opinion of one of the judges, who was on the majority side of the case. e linguist Geo rey K. Pullum commented (2004: 1-2):
[ e judges] got the wrong answer, because they perceive (or mis-perceive) that they pronounce unstressed syllables di erently from one another. … [ e analysis is a] tragically under-informed piece of linguistics.
… On a matter as subtle as this, the expert witnesses should not be working for the disputing parties; they should be hired by the judge to work for the court. It's too easy, otherwise, for the experts to tell only the side of the phonetic story that backs up the people who are paying them, and that's what o en happens in cases where expert witnesses are employed by plainti s' or defendants' counsel.
Pullum's suggestion that the neutrality of experts would be secured if the courts hired them runs counter to the fundamentals of our adversarial system (and is not without its own aws: how do we assure that the expert is really neutral? Who is there to point out when the neutral expert is simply wrong?). In England and Wales, in an attempt at guaranteeing some measure of neutrality, experts are required to place in every report submitted to the courts (1) a 'declaration which con rms that you understand your duty to the court in respect , of disclosure' (of, e.g, 'all the material you have in your possession in relation to the investigation') and (2) 'an acknowledgement that you will inform all parties and, where appropriate the court, in the event that your view changes on any material issue' . In addition, the expert is admonished to 'ensure that due regard is given to any information that points away from, as well as towards, the defendants' (Crown Prosecution Service [2009] ).
1 It strikes me that it would be a good idea if American experts voluntarily added such disclaimers to all reports.
Moreover, in theory at least, experts are sworn to be advocates for neither side, regardless of who is paying them (see the contributions of Ainsworth and Finegan in this volume). Even so, Pullum's distress at the judge's naïve acceptance of the 'expert' opinion is nonetheless something that any linguist might well share.
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As practicing linguists, members of IAFL, IAFPA, AAAL, DSNA, and LSA would like to insure that we are represented in court as o en as possible by responsible, knowledgeable members of our profession with the highest level of professional competence. It can be embarrassing and demeaning to see ourselves represented in court by would-be experts who write unprofessional reports and give incompetent testimony. Twenty years ago, Hollien (1990: 38) , wrote: … most experts dread those trials where they have to explain their ndings and conclusions to a court that is unaware that the witnesses for the other side are only super cially competent and actually lack the scienti c and/or professional expertise necessary to comment on the relevant issues. Small wonder that many scientists and practitioners simply refuse to testify or even o er their talents and expertise on a consulting basis.
e presence of such persons on the witness stand may serve to keep really quali ed colleagues away (and add little to the strength of the arguments of the attorneys who engage them in good faith) -and it makes the whole of forensic linguistics seem like cargo-cult science indeed when judges and juries are o ered a view of what linguistics is from a professor whose expert testimony runs counter to obvious linguistic reality: 3 Lawyer: You say in your report that when the trademark TarMan is uttered in rapid speech, the /m/ is frequently deleted. Is that true? Expert: Yes.
Lawyer: Will you please pronounce it that way for the court?
To the general amusement of the court, the expert managed to utter something like [tãrʔãn] -with a glottal stop replacing the /m/ and nasalization spread across the two vowels.
In a similar circumstance, a judge issued a biting condemnation of a 'linguistics expert' whose testimony ran counter to what the judge viewed as elementary common sense (emphasis added): As an initial matter, [the expert's] testimony is based on the premise that 'Mooo' is not a real word and must be considered as the sound a cow makes. Even if it were factually correct that 'Mooo' is not a word, trademark law approves trademarks for words that are not 'real' words. … [ e expert] then pronounced the word 'mooo' by imitating a cow and testi ed that people would naturally pronounce the word in that manner, [but] provided no basis for his view that lay people will interpret the word 'mooo' as he intellectualizes. [ e expert] testi ed that he heard individuals in the courtroom during the hearing pronounce the word 'mooo' as if imitating a cow on several occasions. As the fact nder, the Court wholly disagrees. [ e expert] then further undermined his already unconvincing testimony by repeatedly testifying that he was unable to express an opinion -either professionally or as a lay person -regarding the similarities between any terms other than those for which he had been retained (at the rate of $400.00 per hour). [ e expert's] testimony that his opinion regarding the dissimilarity between 'Mooo Tracks' and 'Moose Tracks' was reached only a er close study and investigation, and his professed inability to give any opinion as a lay person on any other pairs of phrases, indicates that his opinion in this case is irrelevant.
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A second class of 'bad' experts are otherwise competent linguists who extend their testimony into sub elds that are too far from their own (for additional discussion, see Finegan's essay in this volume). Judges and attorneys are rightly impressed by the credentials of such scholars, because they have taught and published in the eld and are respected members of the profession. Whether motivated by hope of fees, fame, social agenda, or the simple desire to be of service to justice, linguists who are approached for the rst time by lawyers may nd themselves in ethically questionable and professionally embarrassing , situations if they attempt to stretch their expertise into sub elds that are on the margins of their linguistic specialization. It is easy enough to think, 'Oh, I'm a linguist -I know more than the lawyers do about the eld: I have taught Introduction to Linguistics and can therefore take on any linguistic question that they might ask me to answer' . Novices who are governed by such thoughts are at the top of a potentially slippery slope that can lead to opining 'with full scienti c certitude' just about anything that the lawyer wants them to say. As Finegan points out, it is di cult to know what the whole truth is if the linguist's view is (1) strongly in uenced by the desires of the attorneys who are paying the bill or (2) in response to a social cause the expert strongly supports and that underlies the attorney's case. And it is painful to realize that one has skirted ethical peril and subjected oneself to no little personal embarrassment when the opposition expert counters with a lacerating rebuttal report or gives devastating rebuttal testimony, and when the opposition lawyer presents excruciating cross-examination.
In short, while the courtroom itself may act as a lter, it can do so at the expense of the linguistics expert who lacks the quali cations for the task at hand. us, in addition to the paramount ethical goal of furthering justice by preventing meretricious testimony, there are two practical reasons why professional linguistic organizations should seek their own ways to enhance the credentialing of linguistics experts: (1) to prevent the public from forming an inaccurate view of linguistics and (2) to protect linguistics professionals from unwittingly interjecting themselves into professionally perilous situations.
Licensing and registries of approved linguists
As Stygall points out in her contribution to this volume, some professions in the United States -notably engineering and medicine -license their forensic experts. Stygall does, however, draw a sharp line between the 'practicing' professions such as medicine and engineering and the academic professions such as linguistics, and she indicates that there are strong reasons why organizations should not get into the business of formally credentialing linguistics experts for the courtroom or elsewhere. Not only does formal credentialing run counter to the predisposition of the courts to depend on point-counterpoint procedures, it would also be a formidable and forbidding nancial and organizational undertaking. For small organizations, nding the experts who have time (and the quali cations themselves) to oversee such a complex and diverse operation -and the resources to pay them for their services -seems an impossible task.
e recent demise in Britain -for lack of government nancial support -of the Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (which was intended to generate lists of approved forensic experts in a number of elds including linguistics) indicates just how di cult it is to maintain such a credentialing body (CRFP Board 2009). Even more unpromising would be a blacklist of poseurs, fools, quacks, zealots, and greedy folks who are seemingly willing to say anything that an attorney asks them to say. In addition to the problem of just who would have the authority to make such judgments and how to go about organizing the procedures, lists of either approved or disapproved experts could lead to lawsuits instigated by those who were excluded.
Codes of ethical practice
e most promising path for linguistics organizations to take with respect to credentialing issues is one that a number of professional organizations have already taken (as Stygall's article indicates): a set of practical and ethical guidelines for linguists to take into account as they consider taking on a legal consulting assignment. 5 is is in fact one of the 'Further Aims' of the IAFL, as announced in 2006 on the IAFL website ('drawing up a Code of Practice on matters such as giving evidence in court, writing o cial reports, etc. '), and while it has not to date been implemented, it is the subject of o cial committee consideration with implementation as the expected outcome. Following Shuy's suggestion (in his introduction to these essays), a set of recommended criteria that lawyers should consider when they set out to look for a consulting linguist could also be useful. Such a set of recommendations could also be of use to judges in deciding whom to disqualify. e Linguistic Society of America has recently generated a general Code of Ethics to which a consulting subcode could now be added (see Stygall's article).
A considerable amount of the beginning work has already been done. Importantly, as Stygall notes, the IAFPA already has a useful, though too-brief (one-page), 'Code of Practice ' (IAFPA 2004) . Several presses have just published or are in the process of publishing handbooks on language and law (Gibbons and Turell 2008, Johnson and Coulthard 2010, Solan and Tiersma forthcoming) . Several of the books that Roger Shuy has written on various aspects of linguistic consulting o er brilliant introductions for both the linguist and the attorney, especially his (2006) Linguistics in the Courtroom: a practical guide.
ese books could be listed as must-read works, and they can be judiciously mined for summarizable information that will get the linguist started.
Hollien's article contains a number of speci c recommendations that could also act as a starting point (1990: 35-36 ):
Nearly any well-educated professional will a rm that he or she is competent to testify in court about those data, theories and relationships that are relevant to his or her specialty. … [However, increasingly one can be expected All too o en, expert witnesses are viewed as 'hired guns' who will reach whatever conclusion is advantageous to the party paying their fee. … Of course, an expert must be competent in a eld that has practical application in the courtroom. And educating academics on ethical standards in the courtroom would be quite appropriate. But speci c training on how to be an expert witness could well back re. Such training makes it appear that the linguist may be trying to become a professional expert, a fact that can be exploited by the opposing side as indicating a desire to pro t from testifying. … In a sense, the most e ective expert is one who is so successful in her area of expertise that she is reluctant to divert her energies into the courtroom as an expert. Furthermore, her limited experience as an expert will favor both plainti s and defendants.
Tiersma's preference for experts who are reluctant to testify seems to me to err too far in the opposite direction -as does his view that the 'limited experience as an expert will favor both plainti s and defendants' . On the contrary, professionalism in linguistic consulting is not per se a bad thing -indeed, the perception that a witness is a mere hired gun who will say anything for pay results from a lack of genuine scienti c professionalism, not an excess of it. Furthermore, Hollien's criterion concerning '[reliance on] scienti cally acceptable tests and/or procedures' is less likely to be within the powers of one who (as Tiersma puts it) 'is reluctant to divert her energies into the courtroom as an expert' . As I noted earlier, the Court in Daubert requires that an expert rely upon methodologies that are not only professionally accepted but are also appropriate to the case at hand. Tiersma and Solan (2002: 225) point out that in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (119 S.Ct. 1167 [1999 ) the United States Supreme Court ampli ed the Daubert ruling to place special emphasis on the validity of methodology. In light of the Kumho decision, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was modi ed to read as follows:
If scienti c, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali ed as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon su cient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
e more thought a linguist has given to the research and scholarship in forensic linguistics, the better equipped such a linguist should be in understanding the nature and reliability of the available methodologies as well as what facts are indeed relevant to the case. (See also Solan, 2010.) Hollien's list of criteria must of course be viewed as cumulative rather than absolute. But, in the end, his list by and large speci es some of the kinds of quali cations that linguistic consultants should exhibit. And, though Hollien does not speci cally say so, the criteria must be interpreted di erently depending upon the type of case that one is involved with. For example, in trademark cases it is generally imperative that an expert have a good working knowledge of lexicography, familiarity with the scienti c literature and methodology in the social and regional dialects of American English, and competence in phonology, morphology, semantics, psycholinguistics, and discourse analysis (Butters 2007 , 2008a , 2008b , 2010 , Shuy 2002 . I believe that some understanding of semiotic theory is vital as well. 6 On the other hand, scholars whose specialization focuses primarily on linguistic theory, or acoustic phonetics, or medieval literature, will not normally be professionally equipped to deal with most aspects of trademark issues, unless they do considerable professional retooling on their own.
No single one of Hollien's criteria is in itself enough to disqualify someone as an expert. An attorney attempting to apply his list to someone's curriculum vitae and (if there is one) testimony record might start by simply totaling up the number of plusses and minuses and compare several linguists for their , adequacy (though they will also be looking for how well the candidate speaks and how generally credible she may seem as a courtroom witness). More important, a linguist who might be thinking about getting into the consulting business would do well to take such a list seriously before committing to participation in a legal dispute.
Let me return brie y to the issue of justice. Although the role of linguists in the forensic setting is rarely the most important evidence that is presented to a jury, we obviously have something to contribute to winning cases or lawyers would not be so keen to engage our services. I have a good deal of sympathy for attorneys who must select an expert witness in a eld that is, for most of them, unfamiliar to the point of arcane. In my experience, attorneys are far more likely to get what they really need in an expert if they can nd and retain persons who are informedly honest and genuinely quali ed -as opposed to those who are (as Tiersma terms them) 'hired guns' willing to say anything that they think the attorneys want to hear (whether their motivation is money or to further a social or political cause with which they are in philosophical agreement).
7 If the major linguistic organizations will present the legal profession with speci c advice (as Shuy notes, 2002: 182-83 ), lawyers will be better able to select the sort of linguist needed for a particular case. And with criteria clearly established, they will have a better sense of how a potential expert might survive the ltering e ect of the normal process -and even how well the same potential expert would fare before a judge in a gate-keeping Daubert hearing.
If the relevant linguistic organizations can involve themselves in this way in the credentialing process, lawyers will get better linguists and the cause of justice will be better served. Organizational involvement, to the extent that it is feasible, is needed simply in the name of being good citizens.
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Notes
1 British linguistics experts testify mainly in criminal cases, not in civil cases.
2 Pullum did not realize that, in this appellate case, the judge who favorably quoted the 'tragically under-informed' expert also cited other grounds for ruling against Lexis; moreover, in a concurring opinion, a di erent judge explicitly disagreed with the 'expert' testimony that the di erence between a schwa and a barred-i was enough to inhibit phonological confusion between Lexis and Lexus. U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1146.at7-9). In still another case (in which I also served as a paid expert but which must remain unnamed owing to con dentiality requirements; the cited passage is taken from the actual deposition record), a putative linguistics expert responded in cross-examination to a series of elementary questions about phonological terminology in a manner that indicated clearly that she did not know the answers: Expert: I can't remember. ere are reasons. I couldn't tell you why. I think one of them is I try to use, in teaching and in my writing, terms that are more self-evident. For example, in consonants I talk about stops and continuants because in pronouncing stops you have to stop and in pronouncing continuants you can continue. Now, a term like that is not nearly as selfevident and I think mainly for that reason I just don't bring it up. It confuses people and it's something you have to memorize. I can look it up in two seconds and think about it, ne. But sitting here I'm not ready to talk about that.
Attorney: Are you familiar with the term 'palatal consonant'?
Expert: Yes.
Attorney: Can you de ne for me what a palatal consonant is?
Expert: I take that sitting here subject to correction, because I don't try to , memorize things. But a consonant pronounced further back in the mouth than a dental, teeth, or labial, lips. You see, those terms, 'dental' and 'labial' , I like to use. 'Palatal' I use less o en. I more o en use 'guttural' . Now, re nements of that can be made and you can distinguish between a palatal and a guttural. But most of the time in talking to students in courses or even writing about it, it's an unnecessary re nement. '
5 Including such speci c suggestions as 'always ask to see the arguments that the other side's lawyers have made already' and 'be prepared to turn down the case if it looks like you cannot actually support the lawyers position full force' . 6 ere is some debate about the relevance of semiotics - Shuy (2002) and I have disagreed about it in court and in print (see Butters 2004) .
7 In his essay in this volume, Nunberg argues that linguists (and indeed all scientists) have an ethical obligation -in every scholarly publication that draws upon data and conclusions that grow out of forensic linguistic testimony -to disclose the forensic involvement. Although such disclosure might seem to some to be immodest self-promotion, I agree with Nunberg's prescriptive rule. Indeed, disclosure has always been my practice in actual publication, although I did omit disclosure in an early oral presentation (which was reportedly tape-recorded and disseminated without my permission) and one online discussion-group posting (see Nunberg's fn6).
I strongly disagree, however, with Nunberg's further opinion that experts who accept cases for little or no pay are somehow less likely to become unwitting partisans than those who accept payment. Although it is true enough that scholars in the forensic environment must struggle to remain unbiased by the agenda of those who may be paying them, it seems to me equally true that forensic linguists must likewise struggle at least as hard to keep from becoming pro bono zealots for a social or political cause with which they are in philosophical or moral agreement. In at least one case, my o er to work pro bono in a criminal case was declined by a law rm that insisted on paying my normal fee from their own co ers; the rm felt strongly that hiring me for pay was far less potentially suspect than having me appear to be one who was primarily motivated by my personal political beliefs and social agenda. In the end, perhaps the biggest barrier to objectivity that we scholars face in the courtroom is the arrogant belief (rei ed by years of teaching mere students) that, no matter what, we are brighter and more competent than anybody else.
